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verdict. The jury believes the evidence, yet wishes to reduce the
punishment for the crime. Admittedly, this is a technical error,
see State v. Prater,supra, but the appellate court should sustain
the verdict, because the defendant has not been prejudiced. The
argument that the appellate court is making itself the final arbiter
of the facts in resolving the issue of prejudice may be answered.
Although the jury either expressly or impliedly acquits the defendant of the higher crime by finding him guilty of the lower
offense, there is no true acquittal. At best, a conditional acquittal
occurs. That is, the evidence proving guilt of the consummated
crime is rejected by the jury on condition, so to speak, that it may
be used to sustain the verdict of guilty of the lesser crime.
In Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393 (1932), Mr. Justice
Holmes stated that consistency in the verdict was not necessary,
and quoted from Steckler v. United States, 7 F.2d 59, 60 (2d Cir.
1925), which said, "The most that can be said in such cases is that
... the jury did not speak their real conclusions, but that does not
show that they were not convinced of the defendant's guilt."
The instant case does not involve the unwarranted finding of
the substantive elements of an attempt to commit crime. By means
of a verdict in improper form, the jury has simply reduced the
penalty for the crime which the proof shows. The defendant has
not been prejudiced and therefore should not be heard to complain.
R. L. DeP.

EVIDENCE-OBTAINED

BY UNLAWFUL

SEARCH-ADMISsIBILITY

TO

DISCREDIT DEFENDANT'S TESTIMONY.-D, at his trial on a charge for
sales of narcotics, testified on direct examination that he had never
sold or possessed narcotics. On cross-examination he reiterated
these assertions. The government then introduced evidence that
in connection with an earlier proceeding a heroin capsule had been
found in his possession. Over D's objection that the heroin capsule
had been obtained through an unlawful search and seizure, the
trial judge admitted this evidence. Held, on certiorari, affirming
the lower court, that evidence so obtained is admissible to impeach
D's testimony given on direct examination. Walder v. United
States, 74 Sup. Ct. 354 (1954).
The sole issue which was presented in this case was whether
the defendant's assertion on direct examination that he had never
possessed any narcotics, opened the door, solely for the purpose of
attacking the defendant's credibility, to evidence of the heroin un-
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lawfully seized in connection with the earlier proceeding. The
question is a novel one, as the Court commented, for a rather
thorough examination discloses, with perhaps one excepton, no
other authoritative decision on the point. The Court relied upon
a dictum in the case of Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925),
as the basis for its opinion. There, under facts similar to those in
the principal case, except that D in his direct examination was not
asked and did not testify concerning the unlawfully seized evidence, the Court said the evidence was inadmissible since D "did
nothing to waive his constitutional protection or to justify crossexamination in respect to the evidence claimed to have been obtained by the search .... " Does this language mean, as the Court
here interpreted it, that had the defendant been asked or had he
testified concerning the evidence, then it would have been admissible? What is the "constitutonal protection" which the Court
in the Agnello case referred to? No answer to the former question
will be proffered here, but it is hoped that the subsequent discussion will answer the latter one.
A novel aspect of the scope of the doctrine of Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1913), is certainly presented by the question
in the principal case. The rule there stated is to this effect:
".. . articles illegally seized by an officer without a search warrant
from the accused's premises, and which would aid in establishing
his guilt, will not be competent evidence. . . ." As a basis for
its holding the Court said in effect that the government cannot
violate the Fourth Amendment-"The right of the people to be
secure . . . again unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated. . . ."-and use the fruits of such unlawful conduct to
secure a conviction. Thus a substantive rule of law became the
crux of an exclusionary rule of evidence. In Gouled v. United
States, 255 U.S. 298 (1920), it was said that "The admission of a
paper so obtained [by an unlawful search and seizure] in evidence
against and over the objection of the owner when indicted . . .
compels him to be a witness against himself, in violation of the
Fifth Amendment." In Agnello v. United States, supra, this statement is found, "when properly invoked, the Fifth Amendment protects every person from incrimination by the use of evidence obtained through search and seizure. . . ." From the decisions it is
difficult to determine whether the evidence is held not to be admissible because to admit it would be a violation of the defendant's
rights under the Fourth- Amendment or of those under the Fifth
Amendment. It is submitted that the rule in the Weeks case is
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correct so long as it excluded only evidence which violates the
self-incrimination clause. The Constitution proscribes unreasonable searches and seizures, but there the guarantee ends. The
evidence obtained, if otherwise competent, should be admitted. To
deprive the state of its use is against public policy. Even viewed
historically, the purpose of the search and seizure clause was to
restrain the legalization of unreasonable searches and seizures.
There is no historical basis for the contention that evidence obtained in the course of illegal searches and seizures is inadmissible.
8 WGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2264 (3d ed. 1940). Can the exclusionary
"federal rule" be justified even on Fifth Amendment grounds? In
most instances it cannot. The evidence illegally seized is usually
real evidence, and it is said that the Fifth Amendment can only
be invoked to keep testimonial evidence out. Ibid.
It would appear from the holding in the principal case that
the law is extending another helpful, but illogical, alternative to a
defendant. Experience has shown that it is necessary that such
alternatives be counterweighted to keep the advantage from becoming an unfair and unreasonable one. For example, the price which
a defendant must pay for attempting to prove his good name is to
throw open the entire subject which the law has kept closed for
his benefit and to make himself vulnerable where the law otherwise
shields him. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948). The
Weeks doctrine protects the accused from an affirmative use of
evidence unlawfully obtained. He does, however, under the rule
of the principal case make himself vulnerable to its use when he,
himself, denies its existence in his examination-in-chief; then it
can be used to impeach him, but for that purpose only.
The case of State v. Cook, 69 W. Va. 717, 72 S.E. 1025 (1911),
presents a situation which is quite similar to that of the principal
one. It is provided in W. VA. CODE, c. 57, art. 2, § 3 (Michie,
1949) that "In a criminal prosecution other than for perjury,
evidence shall not be given against the accused of any statement
made by him as a witness upon a legal examination." The court
in the Cook case said that the statute just cited does not preclude
the state, on. cross-examination of the prisoner, for the purpose of
impeachment, from showing by him that he testified differently on
a former trial of the same indictment. If it can be said that the
rule in the Cook case is correct, and it would seem to be, then the
rule of the principal case must also be correct. They both would
seem to be based upon narrow constructions of exclusionary rules
of evidence which the courts do not particularly like; they would
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both seem to have the same goal, that being to place all the matter
relevant to the case before the triers of facts unless the evidence
is clearly excluded by some rule or principle of law.
Thus, it would seem that the principal case is correct. It is
certainly a step in the right direction and it certainly is another
example of how the courts often attempt to limit the scope of
exclusionary rules of evidence such as the Weeks doctrine. One
case which seems to be quite similar, at least on the facts, to the
principal case is State v. Slamon, 73 Vt. 212, 50 Atd. 1097 (1901).
There it was said that a letter improperly taken from the defendant
was inadmissible to impeach the writer, a witness for the defendant.
This statement appears to be contra to the rule of the principal
case. This case, however, has been overruled sub silentio: Vermont
now repudiates the Weeks doctrine, State v. Suitor, 78 Vt. 391, 63
Atl. 182 (1906).
It is difficult to say just what the West Virginia court will do
in the light of the decision in the principal case. In State v. Wills,
91 W. Va. 659, 114 S.E. 261 (1922), the doctrine of the Weeks
case was adopted. The court, recognizing that there was a decided
split among the states, said, "If we err, we would rather err on the
side of liberty, and therefore we adopt as the better rule that laid
down by the Supreme Court of the United States." Id. at 677, 114
S.E. at 266. The Weeks doctrine seems to be wrong since it is
founded upon (1) a misapplication of a substantive rule of law and
(2) an overextension of the protection of the Fifth Amendment.
If the basic rule is wrong then certainly the rule in the principal
case which deviates therefrom must be correct. This decision
would seem to illustrate the fact that even the Supreme Court is
not sure that the Weeks rule is on firm ground. When this is
pointed out to the West Virginia court perhaps it will overrule
the Wills case, supra, and adopt the orthodox rule.
C. F. S., Jr.

FUTURE INTERESTS-CONTRACT

OF PURCHASE

OR LEASE WITH

OPTION.-A and B entered into a written agreement which by its

own terms was denominated a "deed".

Elsewhere in the instrument

appeared the words "leased premises",

rent", "rental",

'term"

"grant", and "demise". Under this agreement A was to have possession and use of commercial realty, in return for which he was to
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